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MARITIME LIENS.
MOTrVES of public policy and commercial convenience have, on
both sides of the Atlantic, led to a wide extension of the jurisdic-
tion of courts of admiralty.
The peculiar advantages possessed by the maritime lien, the
facility with which, by its instrumentality, employment is secured
for vessels, their repairs made or supplies furnished in localities
wherein the owners are unknown, absent, or if present, without
credit, the great safeguard it affords to all who deal with ships or
ships' credit, providing them with a prompt and simple remedy
in their own forum, and with something tangible against which to
issue execution in the event of success, have been the means by
which this result has been brought about.
To call a privilege applicable to cases sounding both in contract
and tort a lien, must, to the majority of the profession, appear a
misnomer.
It is indeed in name rather than in principle that any analogy
to either the common-law or equitable lien will be found to exist.
Unlike the former, it exists irrespective of possession, actual or
constructive; unlike thb latter, its origin is independent of the
creation of a trust; unlike both, it arises and takes effect by vir-
tue of the act done, whether it be the breach of a maritime, con-
tract or the commission of a maritime tort.
The ship is the most living of inanimate things. " She did it,
and she ought to pay for it," is a familiar manner of expressing
the liability incurred by the vessel held to be in fault in a case
of collision: Holmes on Common Law 25-35.
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The maritime law gives full recognition to this investiture of
the ship with personality-it is she that may make a contract or
commit a tort, and it is against her that the lien is implied.
When procedure is commnced, the suit is brought not against
a personal defendant, but against her by name; and, if the libel-
lant succeeds, she is sold to discharge an indebtedness of her own
creation.
In both the common law and the admiralty, the original method
of enforcing legal liability was to arrest the wrongdoer. The
method of procedure was confined to the action against him.
The law knew no third person in the transaction, unless such
third person subsequently interfered for the purpose of buying
this vengeance off. :[n a numerous class of cases the person most
likely, to interfere was the master or owner of the offender; and,
with the lapse of time, a new principle was recognised, viz., that
of the responsibility of the master or owner .by reason of the
acts of the original wrongdoer.
It is at this point that the history of the common law and that
of the admiralty diverge, each choosing that path which would
best attain the common end. In the former system, the arrest
of the original wrongdoer was, in a numerous class of cases, no
longer resorted to; legal responsibility was more readily and
more satisfactorily secured by proceeding immediately against
the principal. In the latter system, the history of the question
has been reversed. Principals were hard to get at; they often
lived at points remote from the scene of contest, or, if present,
there were circumstances and conditions under which they would
not be liable by reason of the ship's being temporarily in charge
of a third person, for whose acts or defaults they would not be
liable. The maritime law therefore continued to cl.ing to the
arrest of the original wrongdoer; and, in so doing, they availed
themselves of the popular fiction, regarding the ship as an ani-
mate object, and as responsible for her oiw, acts. The necessary
sequence of regarding the ship as an animate object and as
being responsible in specie for her own acts, was that she may be
bound, that she may be proceeded against corporaliter, and that
as against her a liability may exist in cases wherein the law of
agency would not bind her owners.'
I "The lien has been enforced in a collision case against the vessel in fault, although
she was at ,the time under the entire control of her charterers: The Ticonderoga,
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The lien is a debt or privilege to be paid out of the res ipsa,
the ship or its incidents, the cargo and freight, or any or all of
them, the condition of the privilege being that the debt should
have arisen out of such a transaction as is cognisable in the
admiralty: Coote's Ad. Pr. 17.
Causes cognisable in the admiralty embrace both maritime con-
tracts and maritime torts. The test of jurisdiction is in each
class distinct. In the former it is determined by the subject-
matter; in the latter, by locality.
Without enumerating in detail the various contracts which have.
been adjudged to be maritime, it is necessary to remember that
the principle upon which the decisions Test is that the test is to
be applied to the subject, not to the object-that is to say, it is
the sttbect-matter of the contract which must be maritime, not the
mere object-the ship: Leland v. The -fedora, 2 Wood. & M. 109.
Thus, peither a cbntract to build a ship (Ferry Co. v. Beers, 20
How. 398), nor the creation of a mortgage on her after she has.
become a ship (Boqart v. The John Jay, 17 How. 859; Deely v.
The Earnest and Alice, 2 Hughes 77),1 nor the storage of her
sails between her voyages,2 are such contracts as are cognisable
in the admiralty. But if the subject-matter or service be in its
nature maritime, 3 it matters not whether the object be propelled
Swaby 215, 217. And the same rule has been applied when the vessel was in
charge of a pilot whose employment was made compulsory by the law of the port :
The Cthina, 7 Wall. 58. Even though a charter-party amount to a demise of the
ship, contracts of affreightment entered into with the master in good faith within
the scope of his apparent authority bind the vessel: The Freeman v. Buckinglam,
18 How. 182; The City of lNew York, 3 Blatch. C. C. R. 187 ; The Canton; I
Sprague 437 ; The Monsoon, Id. 37. Sailors have a lien for their wages, though
their contracts be made with the charterer: Hart v. Tie Enterprise, 3 Weekly Notes
of Cases 172.
1 But if the mortgage be given for necessaries, the material-man may recover on
his implied lien, though his express one fail: The Hilarity, Blatch. & How. 90.
In England, since the passage of the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875, the
admiralty have jurisdiction over all questions relating to the mortgage of ships:
they are not, however, maritime liens: Boyd's Merchant Shipping Laws 66-75.
2 This service is wholly shore service, is performed on land, and is not connected
with the navigation or employm ent of a vessel : Habbard v. Roach, 2 Fed. Rep. 393.
3 The breach of a contract to carry cargo is maritime in character, even though the
vessel used is a canal boat, engaged in voyage between two ports in the same state:
Te E. M. McChesney, 8 Benedict 150. The services of a stevedore must be regarded
as doubtful: The Geo. T. Kemp, 2 Lowell 477. The watchman has no lien: The
John T. Moore, 3 Wood 68. Contracts made for the removal of ballast in port are
maritime : Roberts v. Bark Windermere, 2 Fed. Rep. 722. A contract to cooper casks
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by sails or steam, by motive power from within or without,
whether she have anchors or chains; nor is it in any way de-
pendent upon the size, form or capacity of the vessel: The General
Cass, I Brown's Ad. Rep. 334; The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557.
Ir tort, as in contract, the jurisdiction of the admiralty has
been widely extended. Obsolete and inapplicable tests have been
gradually swept away.
The presence or absence of tide is immaterial. It matters not
whether the waters whereon the wrong has been committed be
artificial or real, or whether or not they lie wholly within a single
state, or whether or not they form a boundary line between con-
tiguous states. If the injury be complete on public navigable
waters of the United States the jurisdiction will* be sustained
(The Genesee Ohief, "12 How. 443; Fretz v. Bull, Id. 466; The
Magnolia, 20 Id. 298; The Commerce, I Black 574; The Eagle,
8 Wall. 115) ;1 and the rule is that whenever one vessel does dam-
age to another, within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,
the offending vessel' becomes hypothecated to the vbssel and
for delivery, according to a contract of affreightment, is maritime: The Onore, 6
Benedict 564. The weighing, inspecting and measuring of cargo is a maritime ser-
vice: Constantine v. Schooner River Queen, 2 Fed. Rep. 731. Supplies furnished to
a.floating elevator, to the restaurant of a boat plying between New York and Long
Branch, and liquor intended for use at the bar, are maritime contracts: The eze-
iah Baldwin, 8 Benedict 556 ; The Long Branch, 9 Id. 89 ; The Plynouth Rock,
13 Blatch. 505.
I A collision on public n ivigable waters has been held to embrace canals. See
The Avon, I Brown's Ad. Rep. 170; The Steanboat Oler, 14 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.)
30c ; The Young America, Newberry's Rep. 101 ; Malony v. City of Milwaukee, 1
Fed. Rep. 611. Those waters are navigable in law which are navigable in fact:
The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557 ; The 31ontello, 20 Id. 430. When the collision
occurs between two objects, one of which is terrene and the other afloat, the wrong
may or may not be a maritime tort. It is the locality of the thing injured, and not
that of the object by which the injury was done, that determines the jurisdiction
Etting on Admiralty Jurisdiction, pp. 64, 65, 66, 67. The admiralty jurisdiction
has been sustained in a case'of collision between a vessel and a floating dock, the
latter Leing moored to th2 shore: Simpson v. Tug Ceres, Leg. Int. (1879) 339.
And see, also, The Virginia Ehrman and Agnese, 7 Otto 309.
2 The lien does not, in such a case, extend to the cargo on board, but it includes
the freight: The Victor, Lush. 72 ; The Duchesse de Brabant, Sum. 264; The Leo,
Lush. 444. A vessel may be termed an "1offending vessel," so as to confer a lien
upon her by causing damage to another, eve.. though no actual collision takes place :
The Industrie, Law Rep., 3 Adm. & Ecel. 303. And if one ship, by the improper
navigation of a second ship, is compelled to alter her course, and so does damage to a
third ship, the lien is held to run against the ship which compelled the alteration
of the course; and this liability attaches if Lhe damaged ship was not actually
MARITIME LIENS.
cargo sustaining the injury, and the injured persons have a lien
or privilege upon the guilty property to the extent of the injury
sustained: Bdwards v.. The Stockton, Crabbe 580; The Bock
Island Bridge, 6 Wall..213.
Every dispossession of property afloat on public navigable
waters is prima facie a maritime tort, and the vessel is liable
for all acts by the master done in the execution of the business
in which she is employed by which third persons are injured,
whether the injury be occasioned by an unlawful act, negligence
or want of skill: Dias v. The Revenge, 3 Wash. 0. 0. 262; Dean
v. Angus, Bee 369; The Hartha Anne, Olcott 18; Ralston v.
The States' Rights, Crabbe 22.1
A contract may be maritime and yet personal-or, in other
words, the circumstances may repel the presumption of lien ; or
the cause may be maritime, and yet the policy of the law may
refuse a lien.'
The jurisdiction is significant, not because a lien exists for the
breach of every contract which has been held to be maritime, but
because it points out certain definite limits, to the borders of which
the lien may extend, but beyond which it cannot go.
Maritime liens are divisible into two classes:
(1.) Those which are created by the terms of the contract.
(2.) Those which arise by implication of law.
negligent, even though by taking another course she might have avoided the col-
lision: The Sisters, 1 Prob. & Div. (C. A.) 117. And the lien will extend to cases
of personal injury suffered by a passenger or employee: Gerrity v. The Bark Kate
Cann, 2 Fed. Rep. 241 ; The Bark Tulchen, Id. 600; The Maverick, 1 Sprague's
Dec. 23. And if the injuries be caused by a vessel other than that on which he is
embarked, the lien will run against the vessel adjudged to be in fault; or, if both
he in fault, against both. And the entire sum awarded may be collected from either,
in the event of the inability of both to pay it. But the primary liability would seem
to be against the vessel with which the contract was made: The lVaslington Greg-
ory, 9 Wal. 513; The Steamer Pliladelphia, I Black 62.
1 It is not necessary, in order to enable the libellant to recover, that he should
show wilful misconduct or wrongful purpose on the part of the tort feasor. He may
recover whether the claimant obtained possession by contract, or by conversion to
his own use without any wrongful intent: The Florence, 23 Int. Rev. Record 105.
2 The hiring of a master is quite as much a maritime contract as is that of hiring
the crew. The latter have a lien for their wages, the former has not. This excep-
tion in the maritime law of the United States is said to have had its origin in the
circumstance that it was contrary to the policy of the law to vest this power in the
master, who might be thus in a position to avail himself of it as against his owners
without proper cause: The Ship Grand Turk, I Paine 73.
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As between themselves, prima facie parties may, by contract,
agree upon what they please; they may agree to give a lien where
none exists, or to renounce one where it.does exist. It is only
whdn the contract is illegal, or when thQ rights of third parties
are contravened that the law interferes. The limits of this article
preclude any consideration of liens thus created.
With regard to implied liens, the rule is that,, by the general
maritime law, liens are implied for the performance of all executed
maritime contracts lawfully entered into: The Williams, 1 Brown
214.
The general maritime law is only so far the law of any country
as it has been adopted by that country. Whilst, therefore, the
general maritime law is the basis of the maritime law of the
United States, certain qualifications and exceptions nevertheless
exist which sensibly influence our maritime code.
The points of difference which exist in the maritime law of each
nation are for the most part to be found on the border line, where
the local or municipal law comes in conflict with the general mari-
time law.
In the United States this difficulty has been increased by the
complex character of our government, where separate and distinct
powers of sovereignty are exercised by the United States and a
state independently of each other within the same territorial limits.
In order to draw the line of demarcation between the two classes
of cases, it is proposed to consider separately (1) the liens implied
by the maritime law of the United States; (2) the liens arising by
force of the municipal law, but enforceable in the admiralty. The
former class might with propriety be termed pure maritime liens,
whilst the latter are but quasi maritime. Pure maritime liens
arise and take effect by virtue of the act done or wrong committed
without any express words stipulating therefor, or, in other words,
the law implies a lien as a sequence to the responsibility attach-
able to the ship as a living thing, having the ability to make
contracts or commit torts.
Of course, it is a good defence to a lien which is asserted, to
aver and prove that the credit was personal, that it was given to
the owner or master, and not to the ship.
The question of credit is one purely of fact, the presumption of
law being in favor of the doctrine that the credit of the ship was
implied, that it was an element of the original contract; the char-
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terer of a vessel, the shipper of goods, the seamen who are hired
for the voyage, all presumptively deal with the ship as 'a living
thing, and contract with her on a credit of her own; and if it be
asserted that the credit was personal, the presumption may be
rebutted, but the law casts the burden of proof upon him who
denies the existence of the lien. The lien is not dependent upon
the doctrine of agency, the master can impress liens on his vessel
hy acts or neglects for which his principal would not be bound, as
for example when he is appointed by a special owner or even in
cases where he is not lawfully master at all; and so conversely
there may be cases in which the vessel may be proceeded against,
as for salvage services or for a bottomry bond negotiated on her
credit, or for repairs caused by a collision, though her owners could
not be sued therefor: Oakes v. Richardson, 2 Lowell 173; Free-
man v. Buckingham, 18 How. 182; The City] of New York, 8
Blatch. C. C. R. 187. The question of credit is especially
significant when the advantages of the maritime lien are invoked
in suits growing out of contracts with material men.
Contracts of this character will be subsequently considered; it
is sufficient for-our present purpose to say, that they differ essen-
tially from maritime contracts in general, that they are not strictly
ma.itime, and that the lien differs both in its origin, reason and
application from that given by the general maritime law. In the
cases of contracts previously referred to, it has been assumed that
they were not only maritime but also executed. Suppose, hov-
ever, they are maritime but executory.1 The maritime law appears
to draw a distinction between a misfeasance and non-feasance, in
cases of this character. To illustrate, if there be concluded
between A. and B. a charter-party by which it is agreed that A.'s
vessel shall sail from Philadelphia for Boston, and she never clears
for the latter port, B.'s remedy will be confined to a personal suit
I If they are cccutory in the sense of being incomplete, as in preliminary con-
tracts leading to tie execution of maritime contracts, they are without the jurisdiction
of the admiralty. In the Schooner Clyde, 8 Weekly Notes of Cases 188, it was
held that the admiralty had no jurisdiction in personam for the breach of a contract
made by the master of the vessel to purchase cargo, and that the insertion thereof
in the charter-party did not make it a maritime contract.
If, however, the contract as a whole be maritime, the mere circumstance that cer-
tain stipulations contained therein arc not strictly maritime will not prevent the
court's entertaining jurisdiction. In such a case the contract is not regarded as
being severable: The Pacific, 1 Blatch. C. 0. R. 470.
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against A. But if, on the other hand, she does clear from Phila-
delphia, and instead of proceeding to Boston as stipulated for in
the contract, goes elsewhere, B. may then elect either to sue A.
personally or to proceed against the vessel. In either event the
injured party may sue in the admiralty, because the subject-mat-
ter of the contract is maritime. But in order to entitle a suitor to
sue in rem, it is not enough that the contract should be maritime,
the-breach must also be maritime, or there must, in other words.
be both a maritime contract and a maritime cause of action: The
William Fletcher, 8 'Benedict 537 ; The General ,Sheridan, 2 Id."
294; Scott v. Chaffee, 2 Fed. Rep. 401. See, however, contra,
The Williams, 1 Brown's 208; The Pacific, 1 Blatch. 507.
This is, it is believed, the philosophical explanation of the prin-
ciple upon which this distinction is based. The most obvious
application of the doctrine is found in a line of cases wherein a
lien has been claimed for the breach of a contract of affreight-
ment.
It is an elementary principle of the maritime law that there
exists a reciprocal obligation between the ship and cargo, that each
is pledged to the other for the faithful performance of the contract.
But it is manifest that so long as the contract remains executory,
or, in other words, until delivery has taken place, there can be no
duty to carry, and ergo no lien arises.' Actual contact of ship
and cargo is not necessary; the rule would seem to be that when-
ever such'a delivery has been made to the carrier as would impose
upon him the extraordinary liabilities attaching to his character,
there is created a lien upon the ship to secure the performance of
the contract.
2
I But when delivery has been made, the contract is no longer executory, and the
duty to carry at once arises, and if the contract is rescinded by the shipper, the
carrier may proceed to collect his damages against the cargo, even thougLh he has
never started on his voyage : The Hermftdge, 4 Blatch. C. C. R. 474.
2
In The Edwin, 1 Spragie 478, affirmed in 24 How. 386, the lien was sustained
for cargo lost on a lighter whilst on its way to the vessel, the court holding that if
the delivery be made to the master the lien existed, irrespective of the circumstance
that actual contact had not taken place. A contrary doctrine was expressed in
Freeman v. Buckingam, 18 How. 182, and also in Vanderwater v. Mills, 19 Id. 82.
Neither case, however, was decided on that ground. The real issue in the former
case being whether the ship was liable for the fraudulent signing of a receipt by the
master for goods which lie never received. In the latter case the contract was held
to be one of partnership and not of affreightment, and therefore not within the juris-
diction of the court.
